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CANON LAW IN AMERICAN JURISDICTIONS*
"The ways and traditions of mankind, persistent though they seem, are
no less in a state of flux and development than any other part of organic life."
-PROFESSOR FRANK W. TAUSSIG.
FREDERICK G. McKEAN*
It is a far cry from the twelfth century quarrel of Henry the Second and
Thomas a Becket about jurisdiction over criminal clerics to the days of
twentieth century America. Yet we find an echo of that famous controversy
and its consequences so late as the year 1909, when the Act of Congress'con-
taining the words "benefit of clergy", was repealed., Back of this contest
rises the picturesque figure of Rollo, first of the Normans, a very practical
individual whose conversion to Christianity was not so thorough as to dis-
place his belief in the old gods of the Northland, for when he felt the approach
of death (about a century before the birth of William the Conqueror), he
offered human sacrifices to Thor and Odin, as well as gifts of gold to the
Church.3 In his life-time, Rollo had accorded official recognition of the
autonomy of the ecclesiastical courts; and, if the writer's surmise is correct,
this action gave rise to at least one of the historic sources of the systems of
probate and divorce law in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. Rollo's descendant,
William the Conqueror, an exemplar of the Norman genius for organization,
in the course of consolidating his English conquests effected most of his
changes by means of Continental clergymen, whom he substituted for the
Anglo-Saxon bishops whom he ousted from their sees. Many of the new
officials, such as Lanfranc, the graduate of Pavia,4 were lawyers rather than
theologians; and, in general, the new bishops have been described as men
versed in the jurisprudence of Hildebrand's revival and the Roman procedure
of the Theodosian Code.
When opportunity presented itself, which was about the year 1070, Wil-
liam I, by an ordinance in the nature of an executive order, separated the
ecclesiastical and temporal judges, who thitherto had sat together, and assign-
ed to the former jurisdiction over matters "quae ad regimen animarum pertin-
*There is no desire to enter the field of religious polemic, but only an endeavor to out-
line the influence that the law of the old Ecclesiastical Courts of England has had in temporal
courts of American jurisdictions.
L.L.B., Harvard University 1897; Judge of District Court of Virgin Islands of United
States, 1920-1924. Member of Pennsylvania Bar. Contributor to numerous legal periodicals.
lAct of April 30, 1790, sec. 31, R. S. sec. 5329.
2Act of March 9, 1909, sec. 341.
sHaskins, Normans in European History. 16 (1915); Palgrave, Normandy & England, II,
34 (1919 ed.).
'A recent writer is of the opinion that the law of the Lombards, studied by Lanfranc at
Pavia, was closely akin to that of the AngloSaxons--Senior, Roman Law in England before
Vacarius, 46 Law Quarterly Review 191. 201 (1930).
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ent," thus following the system which he had inherited in Normandy as a
descendant of the polytheistic Rollo. Heretofore the bishops had done most
of the judicial work pertaining to matters of ecclesiastical cognizance;. but on
the separation of the courts the dioceses were broken up into archdeaconries,
and archdeacons who had been trained in Continental universities took over
the new courts. By all accounts the new system does not seem to have
worked well, at first: but Theobald, Archbishop of Canterbury (1139-1169),
who had studied the revived Justinian Code and Digest, and who had written
handbooks of procedure, introduced Vacarius as a teacher of civil law at
Oxford in 1149. King Stephen expelled Vacarius, but could not undo the
work accomplished by that great teacher. In 1151 Gratain completed his
Decretum or "Concordance of discordant canons," and thus laid the founda-
tions of the jus commune ecclesiasticum of Western Europe. A few years
previously (about the year 1118, A. D.) the compiler of Leges Henrici bor-
rowed many passages from Burchard of Worms or some other canonist in an
effort to integrate his collection.' All of this was prior to the gradual fusion-
of the coutumes, West Saxon, Dane-law, Mercian and others into the com-
mon law of England, a system which is said to have borrowed its very name
from jus commune of the canon law, although the term did not come into
general use before the days of Edward the First.
There is a wide-spread feeling that the common law is a purely indige-
nous product; but it is submitted that the system is of complex origin, although
of local development, and that some of its doctrines which are still extant,
have been derived from or influenced by the canon law (imperio rationis if not
ratione imperii), especially in the field of maxims, many of which are found in
Sexte under the title regulae.6 An abortive start towards the development of
a common law was made when Henry the First designated certain members
of the curia regis to sit occasionally in the county courts as itinerant justices,
but Stephen failed to follow this practice, and in addition permitted appeals
from the spiritual courts to the Roman see. Henry the Second, a French
prince of tremendous energy (he ruled th greater part of France in addi-
tion to England) revived the system of justiciari itinerantes, or justices of
eyre, and made the inquest (which grew by imperceptible degrees into the
modern jury) a regular part of civil procedure. He attempted to restore the
relative position of State and Church to what it had been in the days of Wil-
liam the Conqueror and his legal adviser, Archbishop Lanfranc. In further-
ance of this effort the king procured the passage of the Constitutions of
Clarendon 7 which gave the royal justices and not the church courts the say
5Pollock & Maitland's History of English Law, I, 117 (2d, 1898 ed.).
GThere is such a variety of ways of citing Corpus Juris Canonici, that the average read-
er would find it easiest to consult the additions, which like that of 1584, refer to column and
line in their indices, whenever he may have occasion to look up a question of the old canon
law.
tStat 10 Hen. II, c. 15 (1164).
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as to disputed questions of jurisdiction. Thereafter the contest for jurisdic-
tion, each side seemingly acting upon the adage boni judicis est ampliare
jurisdictionem,8 was between Canterbury and Westminster; but in the political
struggle between Church and State, prelates were frequently found to be
champions of the Nation, for Lanfranc and Langton were not alone among
the clergy who took sides with the temporal power: and a glance at the statute
books shows that the bishops and abbots, who were members of Parliament,
joined in the enactment of much legislation which asserted the supremacy of
the State. Even a Becket assented to the Constitutions of Clarendon, al-
though he subsequently attempted to repudiate his agreement. Furthermore,
we should not overlook the fact that many bishops and other clergy played an
important part in the development of the law of the king's courts from the
days of Bracton 9 to the end of the Middle Ages. That a prelate as a royal
official might take a different view of a legal question from that which might
appeal to him as a bishop or archdeacon, is no more surprising than that there
were certain divergences of view on points of constitutional law between Mr.
Secretary Chase and the same gentleman as Mr. Chief Justice Chase.
After the murder of Thomas a Becket, jurisdiction over criminal clerks
was conceded to the Courts Christian by a concordat between Henry II and
a papal legate in the year 1176.10 In January of the same year, there issued
the Assize of Northampton which was a re-enactment of the Assize of Claren-
don with the addition of new clauses, one of which originated or confirmed
the assize of mort d'ancestor, while other clauses defined the pleas, criminal
and civil, to be reserved for hearing by the royal justices. The Court of
King's Bench, which curbed the activities of the ecclesiastical courts as well
as those of many temporal courts, has been derived from a small inner tri-
bunal which Henry created in re-organizing the curia regis. About the year
1189, Glanville, the justiciar (whose secretary was the famous Hubert
Walter, subsequently a justice of the curia regis, Archbishop of Canterbury,
etc.), wrote the first book of English law, in form a book of legal procedure.
In this celebrated work, we find that there already existed a powerful instru-
mentality in the writ of prohibition, whereby the royal courts were enabled to
check expansive tendencies of the ecclesiastical courts, and eventually to
absorb vast bodies of law which had originated in the Courts Christian.
Henry's successor, Richard the Lion-Hearted, spent most of the period of his
reign outside of England. There is very little to note about this reign apart
gThere is an adverse criticism of the misleading maxim boni judicis est ampliare, made by
Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Phillips, 1 Burr. 292, 304 (Eng. 1757).
OWe should not forget that Bracton, the first-known writer to cite precedents, and the
judges whose decisions he used as authorities were clergymen.
'°Antiquarians and others interested in this by-path may find traces of the benefit of
clergy plea derived from this concordat, in a few American cases, such as: State v. Carroll,
27 N. C. 139 (1844); Com. u. Gable, 7 S. & R. 422 (Pa. 1821); State P. Bosse, 8 Rich. 276
(S. C. 1855); Corn. v. Posey, 4 Call. 109 (Va. 1787).
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from the facts that, "legal memory" dated from his coronation, September 3.
1189; the courts of common pleas originated about this time; and the plea rolls
date their beginning from the 6th year of his reign (1195).
In the following reign, much of the fundamental law of English-speaking
jurisdictions originated or assumed definite form, for the outcome of the polit-
ical struggles of that shifty monarch, King John. had a lasting effect upon the
law and constitution of England. As is well known by the most casual read-
er of English history, in 1215, the prelates and magnates forced the king to
sign Magna Carta. This document was confirmed a number of times after-
wards. The most important version in American eyes is that of Henry the
Third," portions of which were received in some jurisdictions as part of their
local law.12 In the course of time the lex terrae principle became embedded in
the formula "due process of law" in many state constitutions as well as in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Like
many American state constitutions the Charter was a medley of fundamental
law and "police" statutes. Its heterogeneous character is shown by such mis-
cellaneous provisions as those concerning dower and the widow's "quaran-
tine," as well as the one fixing the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster.
By an evolutionary interpretation the right to trial by jury was secured. The
Church was not overlooked, for it was provided that the "English Church
should be free and her liberties inviolate.""13
John's successor, Henry the Third, has been referred to by Dante as a
commonplace individual; but his name is of especial interest to students of
American legal history, when we recall that the earliest English statutes
which became common law in some of our States, date from his reign, and
bear his name. 4 Next to the re-issued version of Magna Carta of February
I lth, 1225,15 one of the most far-reaching, in its effect, of the enactments
which bear the name of this powerful ruler, was the Statute of Merton, 6
which recorded the refusal of the barons to adopt the civil law and canon law
rule of legitimation. The influence of the emphatic stand there taken is said
119 Hen. III. (1225).
12Cf. 3 Binn. 495 (Pa. 1808); 1 Brevard, Pub. Stat. Law of South Carolina, tit. 70
(1814).
"sThe phrase "ecclesia Anglicana" has been variantly translated "Church of England"
and "Church in England" in sectarian controversy; but the law French references to the
Church, as found in the statute books, are generally made in the form "seint eglise Dengle-
terre." Cf. The Statute of Provisors, 25 Edw. III, stat. 4, (1350-1), 6 Complete Statutes of
England. 311 (1929). The accepted legal view in England is that the Church of England has
been a continous body since early Anglo-Saxon times. See' Marshal v. Graham (1907) 2 K.
B. 112, 126.
14Cf. Swift v, Tousey, 5 Ind. 196 (1854); O'Ferrall v. Simplot. 4 Iowa 381 (1857); 3
Binn. 595 (Pa, 1808); 1 Brevard, Pub. Stat. Law of South Carolina, tit. 70 (1814).
2sHenning , England under Henry III, 148 et seq. (1924).
1620 Hen. III, c. 9 (1236).
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to have been an important factor in checking the reception of Roman law by
the courts of common law;"7 but the current was eventually deflected into the
jurisdiction of the canon-law trained chancellors, who, in the course of
establishing the equitable jurisdiction of chancery, made unhesitating resort to
the Corpus Juris and to the Roman elements in the canon law for the elucida-
tion of principles in cases referred to the Chancellor as keeper of the king's
conscience as well as in the solution of problems arising in the exercise of the
royal prerogative of grace. We have been assured that in questions which
arose where the canon law doctrine was deemed ethically superior to that of
the civil law, the canon law principle was adopted.' 8 In fact, much of the
law of trusts and legacies was developed in equity by borrowings from the
canon law as well as from the Roman law.- One of the greatest' reforms in
the history of the common law was the discontinuance of trial by ordeal
which took place in the reign of Henry III. It is directly attributable to the
action of the Fourth Lateran Council, which, in the year 1215: forbade
clergymen to participate in such trials. Of necessity the royal tribunals were
compelled to substitute trial by jury in criminal cases, church law having de-
prived them of the indispensable assistance of clergymen in the ritualistic part
of the ceremonial; and the subsequent conduct of jury trials developed the
unique law of evidence of the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence. An-
other important contribution to the improvement of English law was made by
Bracton's works De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae and the Note Book.
In the course of restating the national law the accomplished archdeacon used
Glanville, Justinian, the Decretum and Decretals of Canon Law, and the com-
mentaries of various canonists to throw light upon the principles evolved by
his researches. Through Fitzherbert, Littleton and Coke, the writings of
Bracton have exerted a powerful influence in shaping the common law of
modern times. Possibly the most potent of all of the great jurist's deductions
is the principle embodied in his phrase "a similibus procedere ad similia,"'2
which is said to go back to the Digest of Justinian.21 and is firmly rooted in
modern law.2 2 Bracton has been said to be the father of the case system; but
his child must have led a precarious existence in its early years, if we are to
attach any significance to the statement of an English judge in the year 1327,
that the king had commanded that the royal judges administer law and justice
in accordance with what had been done in similar cases.
23
171 Pomeroy, Eq. Juris. sect. 20 (1918 ed.).
'sAmos, Hist. of the Civil Law. 434 (1883).
1913 Halsbury, Laws of England, 8 (1910).
2OBracton, f. I b.
ZD. 1. 3. 12.
Z2Cf. Hodgets v. New England Screw Co., I R. I. 312, 356 (1850); Jacob V. State, 22
Tenn. 493, 515 (1842). This doctrine seems to be the basis of the maxim pari ratoine, eadehi
est [ex.
-Y. B. 1 Edw. III, 24.
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The reign of Henry's successor. Edward the First, has been described
by Bishop Stubbs as an age of definition. Henry de Bracton's systematic
exposition of the law of England--"the best treatment of the entire body of
the common law before the time of Blackstone" '--inspired great work by the
judges and lawyers of this period. At the same time the legislation of
Edward's day, not only restated much law and cleared away some archaic
provisions, but, in addition, outlined seine e'xpansive principles which have
proved their worth for many generations. One of the most fertile of the
many statutes of this era, and probably the most important law ever enacted
in England, was the provision for writs "in Consirnili Casu," 2 - which is the
source of vast bodies of doctrine in the law of torts, contracts and quasi-con-
tracts. Many commentators have criticized the judges of England for not
interpreting the act so as to authorize courts of common law to function as
courts of equity by means of the writ of trespass on the case. But, as pointed
out by that very modest genius, the late Dean Ames, the fundamental differ-
ences between actions in rein and actions in personam, between compensation
for wrong and restitution of the status quo. distinguish the failure (if it be a
failure) to utilize the power; 2' which, on the other hand, is said to have been
availed of by John Waltham, bishop of Salisbury and chancellor to Richard
II, in the invention of the writ of subpoena in equity. "by a strained interpreta-
tion" of the statute,2 in order to make the feofee to use accountable to his
cestui que use. Although Edward had a great lawyer and prelate as chan-
cellor in the person of Robert Burnell, bishop of Bath and Wells, and a com-
petent legal adviser in the civilian Accursi, who inherited some of the talent
of a famous father, there were frequent controversies between Crown and
Canterbury, or, as picturesquely phrased in Pollard's "Evolution of Parlia-
ment," a conflict between " the regnum and the sacredotium.'"
The never-ceasing border warfare of the ecclesiastical judges and the
royal judges over the boundaries of their respective jurisdictions gave rise to
some important legislation in attempted settlement of these disputes. One
enactment, the Statute of the Writ of Circumspecte Agatis,2 provided that the
Courts Christian were not to be interfered with in matters merely spiritual.
A curious requirement of this writ or statute (writ in form and statute in
effect) was that "Defamation shall be tried in a Spiritual Court where money
is not demanded," coupled with a general provision that a writ of prohibition
should issue against a pecuniary penance for sins. This legislation was
partly declaratory, for ecclesiastical courts had no power to award money.29
24Armes, Lectures on Legal History, 31 (1913 ed.).
25Stat. Westm. II, 13 Edw. I., c. 24 (1285).
26Ames, op. cit., supra note! 24 at 443-444,
27111 B1. Com. 51.
28State. 13 Edw. I (1285); 6 Halsbury, Complete Statutes of England, 158 (1929).
29Cf. Burn, Eccl. Law, 50 (1845 ed.).
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A few years later the Statute of the Writ of Consultations" was enacted, which
protected the ecclesiastical courts against unfair encroachment, by allowing a
writ of appeal against prohibitions, which was termed a writ of consultation.
During this era of mental activity, the ecclesiastical lawyers engaged in a
contest of wits with parliament. First, the canonists evaded the prohibition
against alienation of the Statute De Religiosis31 by collusive suits. Parlia-
ment replied by chapter 32 of the Statute of Westminster II,32 with a pro-
vision authorizing inquiry into the demandant's title; and followed this in
chapter 3 of the Statute of Quia Emptores.13 by excluding alienation in
mortmain. Undismayed by these setbacks, the decretists employed uses to
evade the inability of religious houses to accept gifts of land. This facility of
evasion was not coped with successfully until it was abolished by the Statute
subjecting uses to the statutes of mortmain.34 In addition to defining the
respective jurisdictions of the ecclesiastical and the common law courts, con-
siderable attention was directed towards reforming the law of decedents
estates.)5 Thus, for example, executors were given a remedy to sue for an
account in the royal courts2 6  Chapter 19 of the same statute directed the
ordinary (bishop) to pay the creditors of an intestate, so far as the goods
would extend, as if he, the ordinary, were an executor.37  Meanwhile, there
was a partial and very 'gradual infiltration of canon law and religious ideas
into the common law. Sunday became dies non juridici by a canon of the
Church incorporated into the common law.38 The ancient doctrine of mens
rea, which traces back to the so-called Leges Henrici Primi,39 had an historic
antecedent in the writings of St. Augustine.4" The important doctrine of
judicial notice, the tremendous potentiality of which was demonstrated by
3118 Edw. I (1289-90): 6 Halsbury, op. cit. supra n. 28, p. 161.
.3Stat. 7 Edw. I, stat. 2. c. 13 (1279); If Ramsay. Revenues of the Kings of England,
1066-1386, 15 (1925).
'123 Edw. 1 (1285).
.-'318 Edw. I (1290).
•4Stat. Rich. II, c. 5 (1391).
35These reformatory statutes have been accepted as law in many American jurisdictions.
Cf. McKean, British Statutes in American Jurisdictions, 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 195 (1929).
36Stat. 13 Edw. I., c. 23 (1285).
37Stat. 13 Edw. I, c. 19 (1285). The statute, 31 Edw. III, stat. 1, c. 11 (1357), ex-
tended this remedy to administrators, and in addition, provided that the ordinary should
depute the next and most lawful friends of the intestate to "administer and dispose for the
soul of the dead," and to sue and be sued. Holcombe u. Phelps. 16 Conn. 127, 135 (1844):
Ellmaker's Estate, 4 Watts 34. 38 (Pa. 1833). This last-mentioned statute was amended by
Statute 21 Hen. VIII, c. 5 (1529), to give a right of administration to the widow or next of
kin.
38Story v. Elliot, 8 Cow. 27 (N. Y. 1827); Swann v. Broom, Burr. 1595, 1599 (Eng.
1764).
39c. 5, 28 (c. 1118).
"0 Levitt, The Origin of Mens Rea, 17 11. L, Rev. 117, n. 1 (1922).
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the brilliant Mr. Justice Brandeis, before his elevation to the bench,4" has been
traced back to the civil and the common law.4 2 The "exceptions" (now
termed "challenges") against jurors in courts of common law were origin-
ally the same as those against witnesses in the Courts Christian, according to
Glanville."s Furthermore, as previously noted, it is a matter of common ob-
servation that a number of canon law maxims have seeped into the common
law, especially during the period in which the Decretals or Five Books of
Gregory IX, and the Sextus Decretalium or Sexte of Boniface VIII, made
their appearance. These rules of logic, of justice, of convenience and of
policy (mostly designated regulae juris in the old Corpus Juris Canonici)
were practically identical in form in the canon law and common law systems
-much closer in fact than either was to the passages in Justinian to which
painstaking writers often ascribe specific maxims of the common law. Often
adversely criticised by those who properly object to the employment of such
aphorisms as algebraic formulas, these portable statements of legal doctrine,
dubbed "legal short-hand" by the late Sir John Salmond, have done yeoman
service when intelligently employed and not mechanically applied in the de-
cision of numerous hard-fought cases.
Occasionally it has been asserted that privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is of canon law provenance;", but modern research discountenances this
view.4 5 As a matter of fact, the inquisitorial procedure of equity is said by
very able writers to have been borrowed from ecclesiastical practice, and
even in the realm of public law we find the "Star Chamber Statute"" author-
izing the examination of an accused under oath. At a much later time, that
of the Restoration of Charles the Second, we find an act of Parliament,
7
which forbade the ecclesiastical courts to administer an oath to any one in
order to force him to confess the commission of a crime-legislation which
introduced a policy that, in the course of time, became a fundamental prin-
ciple of common law, and an important doctrine of American constitutional
law.48 In all probability the constitutional principle forbidding the trial of
criminal cases without confrontation of the adverse witnesses is due to Bibl-
ical influence."9 It may surprise many students, and possibly some members
4
1Muller E,. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908).
2 Thayer. Judicial Notice and the Law of Evidence. 3 Harv. L. Rev. 285, 286 (1890).
'3Glanv. II, 12.
44E. g.. Biglow, "Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere." 5 Harv. L. Rev. 71. 83 (1891).
"5Corwin. The Supreme Court Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 Mich. L.
Rev. 1, 3 n. 4 (1930).
"fStat. 3 Hen. VII. c. 1 (1487).
47Stat. 13 Car. II, c. 12 sect. 4 (1661).
"In essence, the privilege of exemption from compulsory self-incrimination is a rule of
evidence and not a part of due process of law according to the decision in the case of Twin-
ing v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 106 (1908).
"Cf. Acts. xxv:16,
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of the bar, to find that the "common law marriage " of a number of jurisdic-
tions is in accord with the canon law of Western Europe as it existed prior
to a change effected by the Council of Trent in 1563, which impressed a
sacerdotal view. Many generations previously, Alexander III, a decretist,
law teacher and law commentator before he occupied the papal throne, and
one of the greatest canon lawyers in history, wrote a decretal to an English
bishop sustaining the validity of marriage without a priest or religious
ceremony.5 ° Not only has this doctrine of the gifted Pope been accepted in
many common law jurisdictions, but it also took root in the old province of
Louisiana, during the Spanish regime, two centuries after the legislation of
the Council of Trent.
5 1
While it has been asserted with great frequency that temporal law is
"unmoral," this generalization is not without its exceptions. "Usury" was
frowned upon as an indulgence of the sin of avarice; and interest was illegal
at common law as well as by canon law. 2 In times past there have been acts
of Parliament dealing with what is usually the domain of religious bodies.
For example, we find the unworkable statute of Edward III,"3 which seems to
be directed against the sin of gluttony, by regulating what a man shall eat."1
Puritanic legislation, based upon the old concept of Alexander of Hale that law
exists to cope with sin, has had its precedents in such statutes as 13 Eliz."5 de-
claring that "all usury (interest) * * * is sin." and an enactment in the reign
of Queen Elizabeth's successor dealing with the "sin of drunkenness."-"6
The efficacy of such laws, if we are to believe the teachings of history and
experience, is largely dependent upon the current mores of the community in
which their enforcement is attempted. As an illustration, the old law against
charging or collecting interest was easily evaded by various devices, such as
a covenant, a confession of judgment, or a lease of a term of years. The
present-day "aim of the law is not to punish sins, but * * * to prevent certain
external results," and in this connection it is amazing to realize the vigorous
survival of the cy-pres doctrine in our day and generation; for that principle
originated in a pre-Reformation concept that charity is an expiation of sin,
and that one kind of charity would effect the same end as another.- The
doctrine is an anomaly under modern conditions in that it leads courts to
make a will for a testator, which is hardly a proper exercise of judicial func-
8oC., 3, x., 4.3.
5 See the scholarly opinion of Mr. Justice Buchanan in the case of Patton v. Cities of
Philadelphia and New Orleans, 1 La, Ann. 98, 104 (1846),
52National Bank ol Commerce v. Mechanics' National Bank, 94 U. S. 437 (1876); Lowe
v. Waller, 2 Burr. 736, 740 (Eng. 1781); Bac. Abridg. Tit. Usury (1876 ed.).
"3Stat. 10 Edw. III, c. 3 (1336).
5*Longman, History of the Life and Times of Edward the Third, I. 83 (1869).
55C. 8 (1570).
564 Jac. I, c. 5 (1607).
5TAttorney General u. Downing, Wilm. 1, 32 (Eng. 1767).
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tions according to modern ideas of fitness and policy. Furthermore, as Vice-
Chancellor Stevenson, of New Jersey, once remarked in the course of an able
discussion of the cy-pres doctrine, "A thing, which is next or nearest to an-
other thing, is plainly another thing."- It would save much thankless labor
on the part of courts, and would prevent much shocking competition among
charitable institutions, if the subject of unworkable charitable bequests were
dealt with by adequate legislaiion-not a difficult task when we realize how
many charitable functions are exercised by governmental public welfare in-
stitutions. In this class of cases, as well as in many other instances where
legal anomalies are of alien origin, the reasoning of Lord Hardwicke, when
he refused to extend the doctrine of gifts mortis causa,5 9 might be resorted to
with advantage. Surely law should conform to the needs of its day, and
unsuitable rules ought not to be enforced in a changed environment for no
better reason than a dry-as-dust antiquarianism; 0 and if there be any merit
in the cosmopolitan principle cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex, even a long
series of decisions does not always have binding authority where changed
conditions require harmonious re-adjustment6s
The system of equity, which became supplementary to that administered
in the courts of common law, was developed in its early stages by a long line
of ecclesiastics who occupied the position of Lord High Chancellor. It would
be natural to surmise that these officials were influenced by canon law ideas,
58Brown v. Condict, 70 N. J. 440, 445 (1905).
59 Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431 (Eng. 1752), Cf. Michener v. Dale, 23 Pa. 59, 63
(1854). Both Ward v. Turner and Michener v. Dale evince the Anglo-American feeling
against the expansion of rules received from the civil law. Probably the same unwillingness
exists today, whenever a court is asked to expand a rule derived from the kindred system of
the canon law.
0Of course there is no disposition to join in some present-day (or present-moment)
attacks upon current wisdom of ancient origin, by the above reference to dry-as-dust anti-
quarianism. We do not discard the principle of the wheel because it was probably familiar
to Tilglath-Pileser the First; and most of us are alive to the fact that a time-tested legal prin-
ciple may be old without being antiquated or outmoded. At any rate, few modem courts
would reject relevant material in aid of a decision solely because of the antiquity of a refer-
ence. For example, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case of Biwer v. Martin, 294 Ill.
488, 128 N. E. 518 (1920), did not hesitate to delve into the doctrine of lineal warranty as it
stood prior to the Statute of Quia Emptores, 18 Edw. I, c. 1 (1289-90), in order to determine
the effect of a warranty deed. In like manner, Lord Davey, in the Privy Council case of
Kieffer v. Le Seminaire de Quebec, (1903) A. C. 85, 96, 97, traced back from an article in the
Quebec Code through a corresponding section in the Code Napoleon to a passage in Pothier
on which that section was founded, by means of which a quotation from the Digest of Justin-
ian was discovered which proved to be the ultimate source of the law to be interpreted. So
also, Lord Justice Bowen, in the case of Dashwood v. Magniac, (1891) 3 Ch. 306, 362, on a
question whether certain conduct of a life-tenant constituted waste, boldly consulted the Digest
of Justinian, as well as Voet, the Code Napoleon and other civil law writings, saying: "In
a case which is necessarily novel it is desirable to refer to the law of usufruct, on which the
English law of waste is to a great extent based."
OCf. Nordenteldt v. Maxim Guns & Ammunition Co. (1894) A. C. 535, 547, 553, 558.
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and we have been assured by the late Sir Paul Vinogradoff that there was a
noteworthy indirect reception of the canon law in early English Equity."2
Furthermore, as pointed out by Lord Halsbury, in matters not oidinarily dealt
with at common law, equity was free to resort to new sources of law, and the
Roman law and canon law were resorted to for assistance.63 As is the case
with many other institutions which arose in mediaeval times, the origin and
the early development of the equity side of the Court of Chancery are veiled
in obscurity; and, consequently, authorities differ widely as to the time when
the court took permanent form. The jurisdiction began within the Council,6"
but by almost imperceptible degrees a usage developed of referring to the
chancellor complaints addressed to the king petitioning for remedies beyond
the scope of the common law. The cleavage or fission from the King's
Council was, in all probability, accelerated by the enormous volume of
litigation in the reign of Edward the Third, which has been referred to by
Pike;65 and is clearly marked by the Acts of Parliament, 14 Edw. III, c. 5
(1340) mentioning Chancery as among the royal courts, and 36 Edw. III,
stat. 1, c. 9 (1362) authorizing relief in Chancery in certain cases. Executive
action as well as legislation furthered the severance of equity jurisdiction
from the Council. notably a royal writ of Edward III, in 1348, which con-
firmed a previous permissive jurisdiction of chancery by ordering that all
such matters as were "of Grace " should be referred to and disposed of by
the Chancellor or the Keeper of the Privy Seal.Gr It may be inferred that
the equity business of Chancery increased very rapidly in the days of Ed-
ward's successor, Richard the Second, for it was then deemed advisable to
enact a statute67 authorizing the imposition of heavy damages for the bring-
ing of false claims in that court. To a very great extent the rules and prin-
ciples of equity practice were derived from the canon law through the English
ecclesiastical courts, though modified and adapted by chancery as occasion
demanded. 8 In addition, as noticed by Dean Ames, certain analogies of the
6zVinogradoff, Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth Century Jurisprudence4 24 L. Qrly.
Rev. 373, 379 (1908).
6313 Halsbury, The Laws of England, 8 (1910). Cf. Maine, Ancient law, 48 (1906 ed.).
6"Baildon, Select Cases in Chancery, A. D. 1364 to 1471, p. xlv (Selden Soc. 1896). Cf.
Story, Eq. Juris. sec. '19 (1918 ed.).
6sPike, Year Books Edward III, years xii and xiii, p. cxi.
S6Bispham, Principles of Eq., sec. 7 (1905 ed.); Pomeroy, Eq. Juris. I, sec. 34 (1918 ed.);
Spence, Eq. Juris. I, 337 (1846 ed.).
67Stat. 7 Rich. II, c. 6 (1394).
68Hutson v. Jordan. 1 Ware 385, 389 (U. S. D. C. Me. 1837). Cf.: Hamilton, The
Civil Law and the Common Law, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 180, 182 (1922); Kent, Com. 546; K,,rIy,
An Historical Sketch of the Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, 44 (1890); Lang-
dell, A Summary of Equity Pleading, 1, 16 (1883 ed.), A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction,
26, 97-98 (1908 ed.), and Discovery under the Judicature Acts, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 137, 138
(1897); Maitland, Equity, 5 (1908 ed.); 1 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 66, sects. 55, 56.
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common law were followed by the equity courts in dealing with uses.
0 9 So
inquisitorial and so ecclesiastical was the procedure of the Chancellor, acting
in personam, that in the year 1115 the House of Commons complained that, in
Chancery, the "examination and oath of the parties (to litigation) is accord-
ing to the form of the civil law and the Law of Holy Church in subversion of
the common l 'aW70 The term "grace," contained in Edward the Third's
writ of the year 1348,11 had reference to matters requiring special indulgence
or provision.72 It was soon transmuted into the term "conscience," which we
find in subsequently reported cases;,7 but the general subject of equity was
often referred to in the marginal headings of the old editions of the year
books under the title "Subpoena."
For a long time the term "equity," as had been previously the case with
the phrase "common law," was very slow in making its way into the term-
inology of English jurisprudence -a fact which adds to the difficulties of
those who search for early cases in equity. Frequently, as already remarked,
the topic was indexed under the title "Subpoena" or "Conscience." Even so
late as the days of Brooke's Abridgment, we find the subject under the head-
ing, "Conscience, & Subpoena & Injunction." '  At one period of its existence,
the Court of Chancery had a common law or Latin side, and an equity or
English side;75 and in at least one reported case
76 we find the chancellor refer-
ring to himself as "judge temporal," on the common law side, and "judge de
conscience," on the equity side. The designation of the common law as
"temporal " is at least a slight indication that the contrasted equity side was
deemed ecclesiastical in principle; and soon afterwards we find the chancel-
lor giving a remedy "car Deus est procurator fatuorum."7 About this time
the word "equity" appeared in the famous instructions of Edward the Fourth
(1461-1483), directed to Kirkham upon the appointment of the latter as
Master of Rolls, which directions were as follows:
"The King willed and commanded * * * that all manner'of matters
69Op. cit. supra note 24, at p. 239.
70Rot. Pan. 84 (3 Hen. V, pt. 2, 46, No. 23)-Holmes' translation: (This objection is said
to have been pressed with great frequency, See 1 Bouvier L. Dict. 1058 (3d ed.) ).
"'Note 66 supra.
72The modem vi~w is that "when a suitor has brought his cause freely within the rules
of equity jurisdiction, the relief he asks is demandable ex debito justitiae, and needs not he
implored ex gratia.'" Sullivan v. Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 555 (1904).
73E. g., Y. Bk. 9 Edw. IV, 14.9 (1469),
74Brooke, Abridg. fol. 162 (1586 ed.).
75Maitland, op. cit. supra note 66; at p. 4.
76y. Bk. 8 Edw. IV, 6 (1468).
77Y. Bk. 8 Edw. IV, 4 (1468). This view of the outspoken "judge de conscience" was
reflected in more modem language by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
Mclntire v. Pryor, 173 U. S. 38, 59 (1889), wherein an attempted defence of laches was re-
jected, upon a showing of great fraud.
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to be examined and discussed in the Court of Chancery should be
directed and determined according to equity and conscience, and to the
old course and laudable custom of the same court, so that if * * *
any difficulty or question of law happen to arise, that he herein
take the advice and counsel of some of the King's Justices, so that
right and justice may be duly ministered to every man."78
This is a very early instance of an employment of the modern generic
term "equity." It is noticeable that the older term "conscience" still
survives;7" and, in addition, it may be observed that the forward-looking in-
structions contain the germ of the subsequently developed rule of precedents
in equity,80 in the passage where they mention "the old course and laudable
custom of the court."
The sacerdotal fashion in which the chancellors sometimes determined
cases, after discussion with common law judges, is well illustrated by a year-
book case,8' in which one of two co-executors had released a debt and thus
reduced the assets of his testator's estate to such an extent as to render it im-
possible to carry out the testamentary intent. The common law judges were
of the opinion that there was no legal remedy but that a case was presented for
equitable relief, whereupon the chancellor decided that an executor who
fraudulently misapplies goods and does not make restitution "will be damned
in Hell," and that to give a remedy for such a state of things is in accordance
with conscience. In the course of time it was recognized that "conscience
must always be grounded upon some law,"'s which was followed by "The
Father of Equity" when he stated the concept of "Conscience" in chancery to
be "civilis et politica."'3  Sir Thomas More's couplet was still more specific:
"Three things are to L,! judges in court of Conscience ! Covin (fraud),
Accident and breach of Confidence."
About the time when the ecclesiastical courts became the king's court, 8'
there arose a principle of uniformity, in conformity to which Chancery fol-
lowed very closely the doctrines of the ecclesiastical courts with legacies;85
78Kerly, op. cit. supra note 68, pp. 60, 61.
79Van Senden et al., v. O'Brien, 58 Fed. (2d) 689 (1932); Sharp v. Harrison, I Ch. 502,
509 (Eng. 1922).
8°C. Fry v. Porter, I Mod. 300, 397 (Eng. 1670).
8'Y. Bk. 4 Hen. VII, 4-5 (1488) Marg. ref. "Subpoena."
82St. Germain, Doctor and Student, lib. 1. c. 26.
SaLord Nottingham, in Cook v. Fountain, I Swanst. 600 (Eng. 1676).
84Cf. : Caudrey's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 1 (Eng. 1591); Pinfold v. Kide, 2. Show. 396 (Eng.
1684).
"SHarvey v. Aston, I Atk. 361, 380 (Eng. 1737); Reynish v. Martin, 3 Atk. 330 (Eng.
1746); Franco v. Alvares, 3 Atk. 342, 346 (Eng. 1746); Scott v. Tyler, 2 Bro. C. C. 431, 487
(Eng. 1788); Hurst v. Beach, 5 Madd. 216, 351, 360 (Eng. 1819).
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and in like manner adopted common law principles respecting devises. 6  The
same principle of uniformity has given rise to a doctrine that rules of property
established in equity (including those derived from the canon law) should
be followed by a court of common law.81 It has likewise led to an extensive
adoption of other equitable doctrines by courts of common law, especially in
the field of commercial law. As a supplementary system the jurisdiction of
equity not only extends to checking the abuse of common law rights, but its
power' may also be invoked to prevent the fraudulent use of a statute.88 The
best tribute to the many merits of English equity is the confidence with which
most American courts have adopted that system, where unchecked by statutory
limitations or restrictions as to the form, manner and extent to which equity
power may be exercised. s9
The preceding notes have been directed largely towards outlining the
effect that the English Church law has had in the development of common
law and equity. Even prior to the time when that branch of English juris-
prudence became the King's Ecclesiastical Law 10 (a blend of civil, canon,
common and statute law), courts of common law took judicial notice of Church
law when relevant to the determination of controversies in which the royal
courts had jurisdiction.1 For example, the distinction between a corporation
and its members, which was a canon law doctrine long before it was recog-
nized in common law,9 2 was given due effect as to ecclesiastical corporations
in common law courts.
3
Very few kings honored the pledge of Magna Carta that the Church of
England should be free, and the numerous statutes of provisors enacted by
Parliament to prevent the diversion of Church revenues to foreigners, as well
as the statutes of Praemunire 4 against trying cases in a foreign court, were
86Harveg v. Aston, supra note 85; Regnish v. Martin, supra note 85; Sayer v. Masterman,
Ambler 344 (Eng. 1757).
8 7Coates v. Hughes, 3 Binn. 498, 507 (Pa. 1811); Atkins v. HillA supra note 85; Pyne v.
Dor, 1 T. R. 53 (Eng. 1785); Spraage v. Stone, Ambler 721 (Eng. 1773).
8 8Wirtz v. Guthrie, 81 N. J. Eq. 271, 276 (1913).
89Fulton Co. v. Railway Co., 21 111. 338, 365 (1859); Boston Mill Corp., 4 Pick. 507,510,
511 (Mass. 1827); National Docks etc. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., et al., 54 N. J. Eq, 167
(1896). Cf. Pitcairn v. Pitcairn, 201 Pa. 368 (1902).
9 0Termed "canon law" throughout this article, in order to prevent confusion with the topic,
"By-laws of Voluntary Religious Associations," now termed "Ecclesiastical Law," in modern
indexes.
91B3rooke, Abridg. tit. Quare Impedit 12, fol. 168 (1568 ed.).
92The origin of this doctrinal fiction has been ascribed to the genius of Innocent IV (pon-
tificate, 1243-1254). Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 Yale L. Rev. 1, 6
n. 11 (1926). That the doctrine was not recognized in early common law as applicable to
temporal or lay corporations is shown by d case reported in Y. Bk. 17 b 18 Edw. II 70
(1343).
93Y. Bk. 18 & 19 Edw. III 74 (1344).
9 'See Shakespeare, Henry VIII, Act III, Scene 2, for an outline of the writ of praemunire.
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frequently suspended by an exercise of the royal power of dispensation for
purposes of barter.95 This power of dispensation, which covered every kind
of law spiritual and temporal, written and unwritten (except that which per-
tained to matters mala in se at common law),-9 existed until abrogated by the
Bill of Rights; 7 and today "the High Court of Parliament alone can render a
positive law inoperative."'s  As previously remarked, a very early check
upon ecclesiastical jurisdiction was afforded by the writ of prohibition, which
is said to be as old as the common law itself. Blackstone's reference to this
writ as one directed to inferior courts 00 is a very strong indication of the rela-
tive standing of the royal courts and the Courts Christian, which is set forth
more specifically in a passage in Bacon's Abridgment 01 stating that "ecclesi-
astical courts * * * are subject to the contiol of the king's temporal courts
when they exceed their jurisdiction:' yet, as pointed out by Bishop Stubbs,
except in cases of collision with national law, the general legislation of
Western Christendom, whether by Pope or Council, was accepted as a mat-
ter of course;;1 12 and, as a matter of historic fact, more than one decretal was
addressed to English bishops. 0 3  In short, the canon law prevailed in England
only so far as it was actually received with such extensions and limitations as
have been imposed by necessity, expediency or public policy, and subject at
all times to national law, where properly invoked,14
The frequently quoted passage in the Friar's Tale of Chaucer (c. 1390),
about the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts in matters "Of diffamacioune
* * * of testaments, of contracts * * * etc.," might lead a casual
observer to surmise that much of the law of libel and slander and contracts was
developed in the Church courts; but this was far from being the case. Pleas
concerning the debts of the laity could not be tried by such courts according
95Bac. Abridg. tit. Prerogative; Burgess, The Sanctity of Law, 86 (1927); Churchill, The
Crown and the Alien, 36 L. Qrly. Rev. 402, 420 (1920); Churchill, The Dispensing Power of
the Crown in Ecclesiastical Affairs, 38 L. Qrly. Rev. 297-302 (1922); Flick, The Decline of
the Mediaeval Church (1930); Trevelyon, England in the Age of Wicliffe, 107, 108 (1889).
06Bac. Abridg. tit. Prerogative.
07Stat. 1 W. 6 M., Sess. 2, c. 2 (1689); 3 Complete Stats. of Eng. p. 154 (1929 ed.); An-
son, Law and Custom of the Constitution, 301, 302 (1892 ed.).
9sCussen v. Hynes, 1 I. R. 539, 544 (Ire. 1906).
99See Y. Bk. 2 Hen. IV, 10 (1400); Condict 5 Polmer's Case, Godb. 163 (Eng. 1610);
Shotfer v. Friend, 2 Salk. 547 (Eng. 1689).
1003 BI. Com. c. 7.
I 0'Bac. Abridg. tit. Courts.
102Stubbs, Constit. Hist. of Eng., III, c. xix (1890).
103Note 50 Supra. See also Burns, Eccles. Law. I, p. xxii (1845 ed.).
104Stat. 27 Edw. III, stat. 1 (1353); Stat. 2 Hen. V. stat. 1, c. 3 (1414); Convocation
Case, 12 Co. Rep. 72 (Eng. 1611); The Case of a Commenda, Davies, 189, 192, 193 (Ire.
1611); Scott u. Taylor, 2 Dick. 712, 720 (Eng. 1788): Queen v. Millis, 10 Cl. 6 F. 534, 680,
681 (Eng. 1884); Bac. Abridg. tit. Ecclesiastical Courts: Bracton, f. 410; Glanville, Lib. iv. c.
xii, Lib. x. c. xii etc.; Hale, Hist. Com. Law, c. 2.
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to Glanville, 05 nor could cases of defamation be tried in a spiritual court
where money was demanded.106 For a long time this principle seems to have
been honored in the breach rather than in the observance, for it became
necessary for Parliament to enact a remedial statute requiring that copies of
the libels in spiritual courts should be duly delivered because " * * *
divers of the King's liege people (were) daily cited * * * before spirit-
ual judges * * * to answer * * * of things which touch free-
hold, debt, trespasses, covenants, and other things * * * whereof the
cognisance pertained to the court of our lord the King * * * "107 De-
famation, being sin, was of ecclesiastical cognisance, dealt with by the Church,
as was its custom in other cases of sin pro custodia morum of the community,
and pro salute animae of the delinquent. Even so recently as the days of
Henry the Seventh it was held that defamation is a spiritual offense.10s Al-
though Justice Fairfax had urged counsel to make greater use of the action on
the case,l°9 it took a long time for the courts of common law to recognize de-
famation as a tort; but in a special class of cases those guilty of defaming im-
portant personages were liable in damages as well as to criminal punishment
in proceedings brought under the acts of Parliament entitled Scandalum
magnatum."I Eventual recognition of the availability of the writ of trespass
on the case led to the development of the law of libel and slander in courts of
common law. A pioneer case was one which in the year 1535 or 1536"' laid
down the principle that if a calumny charges an offense cognizable only in the
Ecclesiastical courts, no action of case lay in the common law courts; if the
offence imputed was one punishable only in the common law courts, the asper-
sion was actionable in the common law courts exclusively; but if the acts
ascribed were punishable in both courts, then the choice of jurisdiction was
optional. The subsequently expanding jurisdiction of the courts of common
law in matters of defamation eventually crowded the Church courts off of the
field: but the judges soon felt this new business to be very irksome, and Sir
Edward Coke, in particular, announced in the case of Crofts v. Brown,lz that
no more favor would be given to actions upon the case for words than re-
quired by necessity, for the reason that such suits had become "too frequent."
Much hair-splitting ensued, which engendered many anomalies, some of
which have been cured by modern legislation. As previously remarked, the
Courts Christian, in matters of sin, acted pro salute animae of the trangres-
sor. This jurisdiction slowly perished while the royal courts, the Star Cham-
o5GIanv. lib. x. c. xii.
2o6Statute Circumspecte agatis, Stat. 13 Edw. I, c. 1 (1285).
'17Stat. 2 Hen. V., stat. 1, c. 3 (1414); 6 Complete Statutes of England, 166 (1929 ed.).
108"Car le cas de diffamation est tout spirituel offence," Y. Bk. 12 Hen. VII, f. 24 (1496-7).
1g-Y. Bk. 21 Edw. IV, 22, 23 (1481).
iloStatutes: 3 Edw. I, c. 34 (1275); 2 Rich. II, c. 5 (1378); 12 Rich. II, c. 11 '1388).
1Luy. Bk. 27 Hen. VIII, f. 14.
1123 Bulstr. 167 (Eng. 1616).
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ber, and in turn the Court of King's Bench, assumed the role of custos morum
of the community and punished acts of a general immoral tendency or contra
bonos mores, so that eventually the common law expanded its jurisdiction so
as to cover any acts attended with pernicious consequences, obviously in-
jurious to public morals, or tending to the prejudice of the community.""S
Finally, in the Nineteenth century, the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts for
dealing with the sins of the laity lapsed through the old civil law principle of
repeal by desuetude."' In the Middle Ages the law of contracts was very
limited, being practically restricted to "deeds" or "grants," as contracts under
seal were designated, or acknowledgments in court. So early as the days of
Glanville the courts of common law prohibited the ecclesiastical courts from
taking cognizance of temporal contracts; consequently, it seems strange that
the royal courts did not take jurisdiction of executory contracts prior to the
invention of the action of assumpsit; but, after all, the dominant influences were
the landed interests, and there were many communal and seignorial courts
with custumals permitting dealings with many subjects, such as deeds, wills,
defamation. etc., blissfully regardless of courts spiritual and the royal
courts."' Probably very little of our law of contracts derives from the canon
law, apart from the equitable principle of consideration traced by the late Sir
John Salmond to a decretal. 118
It is natural to anticipate that the Reformation would bring about altera-
tions in the composition of the Ecclesiastical courts, and this was effected by
the Statute 37 Hen. VIII, c. 17 (1545), opening these courts to doctors of civil
law, whether married or not. Thereafter ecclesiastical lawyers were termed
civilians, and, in the reports, the law of the courts spiritual was frequently
termed "civil law." A few years previously a declaratory statute"17 sanc-
tioned the Canon Law so far as it was not inconsistent with the "Laws,
Statutes, and Customs of the Realm, or to the Damage or Hurt of the King's
Prerogative Royal." Another important statute"18 restricted the degrees
within which marriage was prohibited to those laid down in the Eighteenth
chapter of Leviticus. As this law was enacted prior to the settlement of
Jamestown, it is conceived that it may be law in some of the American jurisdic-
"53State v. Doud. 7 Conn. 384 (1829); Corn. v. Harrington. 3 Pick. 26 (Mass. 1825);
Updegraph v. Com.. 11 S. & R. 394, 409 (Pa. 1824); Sir Charles Sedley's Case, 17 State
Trials 15 (1663); R. v. Taylor, 3 Keble 607 (1676); King v. Curl, 2 Stra. 788, 791 (1714).
"'Cf. Phillimore u. Machen, L. R. 1 P. D. 481, 487 (Eng. 1876).
-5 Maitland 8 Baildon4 The Court Baron, Vol. 4 Seld. Soc. (1891); Bateson, Borough
Customs,. Vols. 18 & 21 Seld. Soc. (1904 6 1906); Hemmeon, Burgage Tenure in Mediaeval
England, 130 (1914); Gross, The Mediaeval Law of Intestacy. 18 Harv. L. Rev. 120, 130
(1904).
"GSalmond, The History of Contract. 3 L. Qrly. Rev. 166. 177-178 (1887).
"1TStat. 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19. sec. 7 (1533).
"18Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 22 sects. 2 & 3 (1541); revived by Stat. 1 Eliz. c. 1. sec. 3
(1559).
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tions which include acts of parliament as part of their common law.119 The
marriage laws were still of a complicated nature, for it is recorded in history
that the learned Sir Edward Coke pleaded ignorance of the law for three in-
fractions thereof committed in the course of his second marriage. There
never was a divorce in England, in the sense of dissolution of marriage for
subsequent causes, save by act of Parliament, until the institution of the
Court for Divorce and Matrimonial causes in 1857. Annulments, such as the
so-called divorce of Henry VIII, were for canonical causes, such as con-
sanguinity,' 20 in which sentence of nullity could be pronounced by a spiritual
court during the life of both parties; or civil disabilities, such as pre-mar-
riage, 121 which could be dealt with by a competent court at any time. The
fable that in England the king is head of the Church 122 is as persistent as the
numerous mis-citations of the case of Britt v. Rigden12' by commentators and
other writers who quote an overruled argument of counsel as the decision of a
court. A century after the reign of the gross Henry the Eighth, the ecclesi-
astical courts passed through a total eclipse. Almost needless to say, this was
during the days of the Commonwealth, when the Church of England was pro-
scribed under the epithet of "prelacy;" even possession of a Book of Common
Prayer being treated as a criminal offence by Cromwell's government. After-
wards there was much important legislation bearing the name of Charles the
Second, one of the most humane statutes being that by which the abominable
writ de haeretico comburendo was abolished.
124
It has been asserted with great positiveness that "the canon law is no
part of American municipal law. ' ' 12 5  True it is that the titular spiritual juris-
diction of the Bishop of London over the American Colonies'" was too un-
substantial to admit of any formal establishment of ecclestical courts; and at
least one colony (the Province of Pennsylvania) took as a model for its
courts of probate the temporal Court of Orphans of the City of London;127
'19Cf. McKean, British Statutes in American Jurisdictions, 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 195 (1929).
120Waller's Appeal, 70 Pa. 392 (1872), Sharswood, J.
121Benton v. Benton, 1 Day 111, 116 (Conn. 1803); Powell v. Powell, 18 Kan. 371, 379
(1887); Thomas t. Thomas, 13 Neb. 81, 82 (1886); Dare v. Dare, 52 N. J. Eq., 195 (1893);
Barnes v. Barnes, 28 Vt. 41 (1855).
122Stat. 26 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (1534) declaring that the King of England was head of the
Church was repealed by Stat. 1 & 2 P. & M. c. 8 sec. 4 (1554), and by Stat. I Eliz. c. 1, sec.
4 (1559). "Elizabeth did not assume nor have her successors assumed the title 'Head of the
Church'." Maitland, The Constitutional History of England, 512 (1926).
123Plowd. 343a (Eng. 1568); McKean, The Presumption of Legal Knowledge, 12 St. Louis
Law Rev. 96, 105-107 (1927).
224Stat. 29 Car. II, c. 9 (1677); 6 Halsbury Com. Stat. Eng. 176 (1929).
22Amdrews, American Law, I, 207 (1908 ed.).
2ZOThere was no Anglican bishop in America prior to the year 1787, and, paradoxically
enough, the first bishop was consecrated by Scotchmen.
lslHawkins. Orphans Court Practice, 2 (1914). Foi an excellent summary of the pow-
ers, functions and jurisdiction of the Court of Orphans of London. consult Woods, Institute,
540-541 (1763 ed.).
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but at the same time we find dim reminders of the old Courts Christian in such
designations as "surrogate," "prerogative court," and "ordinary," which sur-
vive in a few states. In all English-speaking jurisdictions the burden is upon
him who asserts that any particular provision of the old Corpus Juris Canonici
is in force in a temporal court, 2 " for we probably inherit the old rule that the
canon law yields to the common law and to the statute law. If it be estab-
lished that a canon law rule is of binding authority, the present-day tendency
would be to give it a restrictive interpretation. Where a canon law- doctrine
is considered of persuasive value in the solution of a jural problem, its applic-
ability would depend largely upon consideration of the ancient but by no
means decrepit principle, Equum et bonum est lex legum.12
In American jurisdictions there are at least two angles of approach in
dealing with the law of the old Ecclesiastical Courts of England. One view
is that it is part of the common law.- Another view is that such law is of
assistance, but not of the authoritative weight of English common law and
equity.'3 ' Probably all American jurisdictions would resort to the decisions
of the old canon law courts of England, when questions arise as to the conno-
tation of technical terms derived by statute from English ecclesiastical law,
for
"All law is a compromise between the past and the present, be-
tween tradition and convenience. Hence pure analysis, since it deals
with the present only, can never fully explain any legal system ."1
2
12sNote 104, supra. See also Caudrey's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 1 (Eng. 1591); Burgess V.
Burgess, 1 Hagg. Cons. Rep. 384, 393 (Eng. (1804); The Queen v. Archbishop of Canterbury.
11 Q. B. 483, 649 (1848); Hope v. Hope, I Swab. 5 Tr. 94, 108 (Eng. 1858). Cf. Reaves v.
Reaves, 15 Okla. 240, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 353 (1905).
12Cf. McKean, "The Law of Laws," 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 950 (1930).
1OBauman v. Bauman, 18 Ark. 320, 330 (1857) semble; Jeans u. Jeans, 2 Harr. 38 (Del.
1835); Blewitt v. Nicholson, 2 Fla. 200, 204, (1848) semble; Head v. Head, 2 Kelley, 191, 202
(Ga. 1847); Morgan u. Ireland, I Ida. 786, 787 (1880); Eisenburg v. Eisenburg, 33 Ind. App.
69, 71 (1904) semble; Harrison u. State, 22 Md. 468, 483 (1863) semble; Peters' u. Peters, 62
Mass. 529, 536 (1851) semble; Cowden v. Dobyns, 5 Sm. & M. 82. 90 (Miss. 1845): Wuest u.
Wuest. 17 Nev. 217 (1882) semble; Quiney v. Quiney, 10 N. H. 272, 294 (1839); Morgan v.
Dodge, 44 N. H. 255, 258 (1862); Carris v. Carris, 9 C. E. Green, 516, 520 (N. J. 1873); In
re Hodnett, 65 N. J. Eq. 329, 337 (1903); 1 Bradf. Rep. p. xxvi (N. Y. 1868) semble; Brick's
Estate, 15 Abb. Pr. 12, 15 (N. Y. 1868) semble; Crump u. Morgan, 38 N. C. 91. 98:(1843);
Reaves v. Reaves, note 128 supra; Jones v. Jones, 12 S. C. 623, 627 (1860) semble; Nogees v.
Nogees. 7 Tex. 538, 543 (1852) semble; Cast u. Cast, 1 Utah 112, 123 (1873); Coghill u.
Coghill, 2 Hen. & Munf. 467, 511 (Va. 1808) 5emble; Broron u. Burnett, 1 Chand. 136, 140
(Wis. 1849) semble.
"'1Shaw v. Shaw, 17 Conn. 189, 194 (1845): Robbins v. Robbins, 140 Mass. 528 (1866);
Hodges P. Hodges, 22 N. Mex. 192 (1916); Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332, 338 (1847);
Dandridge u. Lyon, Wyeth, 123, 125 (Va. 1791); Johnson v. Johnson, 4 Wis. 135, 141 (1855)
semble.
"'2Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, 1 616 (1901).
94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
In other words, there are at least three factors in determining the law of any
subject at any given time and place: historic tradition, environmental condi-
tions and current public policy. In the near future it may be that especial
stress will be laid upon the doctrine of Lord Herschel, that "in laying down a
proposition it is necessary to keep in mind the consequences, and not only its
operation in the particular case," and the further requirement that "the law
must be moulded by adapting it on established principles to the changing con-
ditions which social development involves."'13  Generally, speaking, within
the orbit of its jurisdiction, a modern probate court has the powers of the old
English ecclesiastical courts together with a few of those possessed by a court
of chancery; while a modern, divorce court exercises many of the powers of
the old Courts Christian, together with some of the authority of the High
Court of Parliament which it, as well as a number of American legislatures, has
had in regard to the dissolution of matrimonial unions.
'"Russell v, Russell, (1897) A. C, 395, 460, 461.
